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Abstract 
Digital media technologies provide new opportunities for the recording and publicising of 
human rights violations. In recent years, soldier photography during military conflicts has 
become one of the most controversial sources of images of abuse, especially in relation to the 
visual representation of detainees. The backdrop to this article is the death of Baha Mousa, an 
Iraqi civilian who died while in detention on a British Army military base in Basra in 
southern Iraq in 2003. A soldier‟s video footage of Mr Mousa‟s treatment in the detention 
facility has helped to generate a range of cultural, political and legal effects, not least an 
ongoing official Inquiry into the causes of his death. But while new media technologies, such 
as mobile camera-phones, can provide an expanded visual record of human suffering and 
death in war zones, this article argues that this brings dangers as well as possibilities. More 
generally, it raises questions about how human rights practitioners should respond to the 
increasing visualisation of witnessing.          
  
1. Introduction 
The development of new media technologies has had important consequences for human 
rights law and practice. The use of mobile camera-phones and compact digital video 
recorders, allied with almost instantaneous Internet posting, has provided new „technologies 
of witnessing‟.1 More generally, the concept of „human rights visual culture (“what do human 
rights look like?”)‟2 is undergoing profound change as digital imagery takes on a central, and 
even crucial, role. Whether in the context of human rights lobbying and educational 
campaigns, publicising marches and demonstrations, or the recording of abuse and victim 
testimonies, the use of new media technologies is now common practice. Perhaps more 
significantly, the construction of human rights claims, and the extent of public and media 
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engagement with the issues raised by these claims, can depend on the availability of visual 
evidence.
3
 The ability, in the digital era, to transcend national boundaries and effect a rapid 
globalisation of images is key: as Time magazine claimed in relation to the shooting of an 
Iranian woman, Neda Agha-Soltan, at a Tehran pro-democracy protest in 2009, the mobile 
phone footage resulted in „probably the most widely witnessed death in human history‟.4  
Important questions are raised by this growth of new media technologies in the human 
rights field, not least their impact on the historic problems of (mis)representation of the 
victim/violator by the mass media and political elites, and the inevitable contestation over 
controversial images of violence, suffering or death.
5
 In some contexts, of course, visual 
evidence – whether or not in new digital formats – will not be an influential factor in 
determining either official reactions or public disgust.
6
 As Stanley Cohen emphasises in his 
book, States of Denial, it would be wrong to assume that increased visibility and public 
knowledge of atrocities and suffering will provoke outrage or effective interventions; on the 
contrary, images of human rights abuses may work to further strategies of denial amongst 
both state and non-state actors.
7
 Furthermore, in relation to contemporary military conflicts, 
governments strenuously shape the visual experience of the public by deploying a range of 
propaganda. It may also be the case that some images – notably photos of atrocities in World 
War II – fix the memory of past events in ways that limit our understanding of, and responses 
to, visual coverage of contemporary atrocities.
8
 That said, the power of the visual can also be 
extraordinary: in some contexts, a representation of a human rights violation has both 
mainstream cultural impact and remarkable political and legal effects. So, why is it that some 
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images of suffering operate in this way? More particularly, how should human rights 
practitioners respond to the increased visualising of witnessing?  
These questions are explored in a general way in this article. Part 2 outlines one 
particular controversy over human rights visual imagery: the case of Baha Mousa, a 26 year-
old Iraqi civilian who died in September 2003 while being detained for questioning on a 
British Army military base in Basra in southern Iraq. The circumstances of his death are the 
subject of an ongoing official Inquiry,
9
 at which a soldier‟s video footage of Mr Mousa‟s 
treatment in the detention facility is a key part of the evidence.  
Part 3 looks briefly at the history of soldier photography in war zones. It will be seen 
that, in one respect, the Mousa case is far from unique: soldiers recording the abuse and death 
of prisoners, or of civilian populations, has been a common phenomenon in wartime. 
Moreover, from the Nuremberg Trials onwards, soldier photography has been used to 
establish accountability. New media technology, however, changes the concept of the „soldier 
photographer‟: today‟s military equipment has the capacity to provide real-time visual 
records, and mobile phones and digital cameras are also ubiquitous in war zones. The 
increased production of war imagery by soldiers is not just an effect of advances in camera 
technology however. The desire to record, and to visualise, personal experience is a key 
characteristic of increasingly-mediated cultures and lifestyles. Soldiers, even in war zones, 
are choosing to experience life „through a lens‟. Exposed to images ranging from the banal to 
the horrific, they increasingly capture and share photos with military colleagues, family 
members, friends, and wider global audiences on the Internet.  
The final part of the article looks at some of the visual evidence in the Baha Mousa 
Inquiry; specifically, the video of Mr Mousa in detention. While the proceedings of the 
Inquiry raise a wide range of issues, including aspects of evidence, humanitarian and human 
rights law, my focus will be a general one. The visual evidence of Mr Mousa‟s treatment 
helped to translate a victim claim into a wide-ranging human rights investigation, but it 
should not be assumed that the Inquiry‟s interpretation of the video images and the autopsy 
photographs – a hooded body in distress, and a battered and bloodied face in rigor mortis – 
will validate the arguments made on behalf of the victim. Images, whether moving or still, 
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require interpretation and, in legal contexts, the use of visual representations can have 
distorting effects. Thus, although new media technologies have the potential to publicise 
events in war zones, and to provide a visual record of human suffering and death, an 
emphasis on the visual as the most authentic record of past human rights violations brings 
with it dangers as well as possibilities. 
2. The Death of Baha Mousa 
The notoriety surrounding the death of Mr Mousa stems from a number of factors which, in 
combination, have produced unique effects – most notably, the ongoing Inquiry. Four factors 
have been especially significant. First, Mr Mousa died as a result of 93 injuries inflicted by a 
group of British soldiers over a 36-hour period in a detention facility on a UK military base in 
Iraq. The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) has now acknowledged that „brutality and 
inhumanity‟10 occurred, but lawyers acting for the father of Mr Mousa allege that „a torture 
victim‟11 died in custody:      
In layman‟s terms, ... Baha Mousa was beaten to death. ... He died because his 
capacity to withstand continuing conditioning and beating diminished during the 
course of the second day [of his detention]. The physical and psychological conditions 
that he was placed in (including those resulting from hooding, stress positions, sleep 
deprivation and deprivation of food and water) combined to put his body in an acutely 
vulnerable situation. At the point of his demise he was being attacked again.
12
 
The second factor is the flaws in the military police investigation, and in the court-martial of 
seven soldiers, in relation to Mr Mousa‟s death. It proved impossible for a range of reasons – 
for example, evidential failings, delay and, most notably, what Judge Advocate McKinnon 
described as a „closing of ranks‟ by soldier witnesses – to establish fully how, and why, Mr 
Mousa died. Only one soldier, Corporal Donald Payne, was convicted of a war crime; after 
pleading guilty to inhumane treatment of civilians, he was sentenced to one year‟s 
imprisonment in April 2007 and dismissed from the Army.
13
 However, during the court-
martial it became clear that so-called „conditioning techniques‟ had been used on Mr Mousa 
(and the nine other civilians detained with him), and that such interrogation practices – 
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though unlawful – were generally authorised by more senior levels of military command in 
the British Army.
14
 
  Thirdly, the father of Mr Mousa, Colonel Daoud Mousa, sought a judicial review of 
the UK Secretary of State of Defence‟s refusal (in March 2004) to order an independent 
inquiry into the circumstances of his son‟s death. In this test case, which was joined by the 
relatives of five other Iraqi civilians who were killed in shooting incidents involving British 
soldiers on patrol, it was established that the Human Rights Act 1998 (which incorporates the 
ECHR
15
 into UK law) has extra-territorial effect. However, the House of Lords ruled that the 
extra-territorial reach of the ECHR was exceptional and limited to geographical spaces (such 
as an embassy) where the UK had sufficient authority and control to secure ECHR rights to 
everyone within that space.
16
 A distinction, therefore, was drawn between the Iraqi civilian 
deaths occurring as a result of the actions of British soldiers in combat operations or out on 
patrol in southern Iraq, and a death occurring on a UK military base. Because Mr Mousa died 
when in a British military prison, this was within the „jurisdiction‟ of the UK – as defined by 
Article 1 ECHR – and Colonel Mousa was entitled to a legal remedy as a „victim‟ under the 
Human Rights Act. The remedy he sought was a proper and adequate investigation into a 
violent death (in custody) caused by agents of the state, as required by the procedural 
obligations of Articles 2 and 3 ECHR.
17
 In May 2008, the UK government finally conceded 
that a public judicial inquiry into events at the Basra detention facility, involving the 
                                                     
14
 Physical and psychological coercion were used to extract information from detainees, including five practices 
– hooding, stress positions, subjection to noise, sleep deprivation, and denial of food and drink – which were 
formally banned by the UK Government in 1972 after their use by the British Army in Northern Ireland. In 
Ireland v UK (1978) 2 EHRR 25, a majority of the European Court of Human Rights found that the combined 
use of such practices amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment, while three judges dissented on the point 
and argued that the techniques constituted torture. On the attempts by US lawyers to evade the prohibition on 
torture, see Waldron, „Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House‟ (2005) 105 Columbia Law 
Review 1681. For an account of UK complicity in torture, see Cruel Britannia: British Complicity in the Torture 
and Treatment of Terror Suspects in Pakistan (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009). 
15
 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950, ETS 5 (ECHR). 
16
 See R(Al-Skeini) v Secretary of State for Defence [2004] EWHC 2911 (Admin); [2007] QB 140; [2006] 
EWCA Civ 1609; [2007] QB 140; and [2007] UKHL 26; [2008] 1 AC 153. For general discussion, see Wilde, 
The “Legal Space‟ or “Espace Juridique” of the European Convention on Human Rights: Is it Relevant to 
Extraterritorial State Action‟ (2005) 2 European Human Rights Law Review 115; King, „The Extraterritorial 
Human Rights Obligations of States‟ (2009) 9 Human Rights Law Review 521; Miller, „Revisiting 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A Territorial Justification for Extraterritorial Jurisdiction‟ (2010) 20 European 
Journal of International Law1223. 
17
 On the procedural investigatory obligation guaranteed by Article 2 ECHR, see R(Smith) v Secretary of State 
for Defence [2010] UKSC 29; [2010] 3 WLR  223; R(L (A Patient) v Secretary of State for Justice [2008] 
UKHL 68; [2009] 1 AC 588; R(Middleton) v West Somerset Coroner [2004] UKHL 10; [2004] 2 AC 182; 
R(Amin) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] UKHL 51; [2004] 1 AC 653. See also Ramsahai 
v The Netherlands  [GC] 46 EHRR 983 at paras 324-25 (re the meaning of an „effective‟ public investigation); 
and generally, Harris et al., Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
2
nd
 edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
6 
 
treatment of Mr Mousa and the other nine detainees, and any other related matters was 
required.  
The fourth factor is the prominence of two pieces of visual evidence. Prior to the 
House of Lords hearing in the Al-Skeini litigation in April 2007, a press conference was held 
by the lawyers for Colonel Mousa where 46 photographs detailing the 93 separate injuries on 
his son‟s body were presented. Subsequent media coverage centred on one autopsy 
photograph in particular; the close-up image of Mr Mousa‟s badly-bruised face. The other 
piece of visual evidence is a one-minute video taken from a British soldier‟s mobile phone 
recording. The video shows a hooded and handcuffed Mr Mousa, alongside five other Iraqi 
detainees in a room, being verbally abused and forced into painful „stress positions‟ by 
Corporal Payne on the day before he died. It was originally banned from public release by the 
Judge Advocate at the Payne court-martial – on the ground that it would provoke further 
hostility towards British troops then operating in Iraq – but, following its introduction into 
evidence at the Inquiry in July 2009, it has now been „replayed countless times on television 
news bulletins, newspaper websites and on You Tube‟.18      
The Mousa case is especially striking when viewed against an imperial tradition of 
military interventions by British armed forces in the Middle East region and elsewhere: the 
identity and fate of one civilian death in war or insurrection has not usually made an impact 
back in London.
19
 One difference from earlier eras is the growth, and global reach of, human 
rights law and practice; thus, in the Mousa case (and other 2003 Iraq war-related litigation) a 
skilled legal team could avail themselves of, and develop, the resources provided by the 
Human Rights Act 1998, the ECHR and other international human rights instruments in order 
to assert and defend the rights of Iraqi victims.
20
 It is of especial significance that human 
rights law, as distinct from international humanitarian law, has played such a prominent role 
in the task of holding the British Army to account for its actions as an occupying force in 
Iraq. While various duties are placed on an occupier under international humanitarian law, it 
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is obvious that the positive obligations under the ECHR (for example, in relation to the 
effective investigation of controversial killings by state actors) can be much more extensive.
21
 
Another difference from earlier eras is the nature and scale of legal activism, nationally and 
internationally, around many aspects of the Iraq conflict.
22
 Crucially, the UK judiciary has 
been prepared to emphasise (new) principles of legality, distancing themselves from the Bush 
Administration‟s position on torture, detention and international human rights law more 
generally.
23
 Indeed, it would not be an overstatement to say that the Iraq conflict has recast 
the legal relationship between the UK state and war – and that one of the consequences is that 
the memory and minutiae of a foreign military operation can now be opened up to forensic 
scrutiny in legal environments of courts and public inquiry rooms.
24
 In the process, lawyers 
in military cultures, and the question of what constitutes legal expertise and legal risk in a 
war zone, have been forced to the forefront of contemporary warfare.
25
   
What is most striking about the Mousa case, however, is the existence of particular 
visual representations of the time, place and context of Mr Mousa‟s violent death – and 
relatedly, the ability to access and re-access this material on the Internet. There are images of 
Mr Mousa in the hours before and after his death at the hands of British soldiers; there are 
also images of the detention/interrogation facilities constructed in a war zone, interior 
environments historically off-limits to public scrutiny. New media technology has, in other 
words, made visible – to a potentially vast global audience of spectators – what is usually 
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kept hidden and unknown in wartime. Crucially, however, this visual evidence did not 
appear, nor could it have had such powerful effects, in a vacuum. Rather, a sequence of key 
events had to unfold involving a range of media, military, political and legal actors. However, 
once in the wider public domain the representations of Mr Mousa‟s abuse came to be 
interpreted as evidence pointing to wider, systematic ill-treatment of Iraqi detainees by the 
British Army. Official strategies of denial
26
 were doomed to fail in the end because two key 
obstacles could not be overcome: first, the vividness of the visual evidence surrounding Mr 
Mousa‟s death on a UK military base; and secondly, the judicial determination to extend the 
extra-territorial reach of Article 2 ECHR so that a full official re-investigation became 
obligatory.
27
 The „gap‟ in public knowledge between the two images of the same man – 
hooded in detention, and as a corpse with a battered face – could not plausibly be filled in any 
other way. The re-investigation, in the form of an official judicial inquiry, has now been 
running for over two years.   
The Inquiry has a systematic reach, including access to both the official documentary 
trail and key witnesses.
28
 Senior actors – soldiers, politicians, civil servants and legal advisers 
– have been called upon to justify their actions under cross-examination, and to do so against 
a backdrop of significant conflicts in witness testimony and documentary evidence.
29
 As a 
result, there are now competing narratives about the exact role, and complicity, of various 
UK ministerial, bureaucratic, legal and military actors in the use of „conditioning techniques‟ 
on Iraqi detainees. The definition, purpose and legality of these techniques (especially the 
routine use of hooding with sandbags), the motivations for the prolonged group violence 
against these particular detainees, and the failure of commanding officers to intervene at the 
time, have all become key issues of contention.
30
 One especially significant aspect of the 
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Mousa Inquiry is the evidence indicating the influence of US interrogation and detention 
policies (which were explicitly developed contrary to Geneva Convention standards
31
) on UK 
military practices and priorities in Iraq. That evidence, from military and legal personnel, 
includes the following:  
[Banning hooding would affect] UK involvement in US ops where blindfolding is the 
milder end of the spectrum....
32
  
We would also need to be clear what we would do in practical and policy terms if the 
[UK Attorney General] gave clear advice that [hooding] was illegal but the US ... 
disagreed and wanted to continue using it in some circumstances.
33
 
[The] US made clear that they felt the UK were not getting the information from 
interrogation that the US expected, which inevitably had an effect on relation with the 
UK‟s principal coalition partner.34 
The Divisional Headquarters found itself in the extra-ordinary position of seeking the 
highest standards for prisoners but, being knocked back by those in senior legal and 
political posts.
35
  
However, it is the images from the war zone – images that were taken by soldier 
photographers – that give context to the Inquiry narratives. The image of a hooded Mr Mousa 
being „conditioned‟, and of other Iraqi detainees hooded in armoured vehicles and 
elsewhere,
36
 require in-depth explanation. Moreover, the autopsy photograph of Mr Mousa‟s 
bruised face is being constantly re-circulated by the media as the headline to news items 
about the Inquiry and, more generally, about the issue of torture in Iraq. In Part 5, I will look 
more closely at this visual evidence; first, however, the issue of soldier photography needs to 
be put in perspective.  
3. Soldiers, War Photography and New Media Technologies  
To photograph a war zone assumes a presence in the war zone. Only soldiers and military 
photographers have access to the uncensored sights of the battlefield. Photo-journalism, from 
its earliest days, has been subject to strict military and political controls; these in turn meant 
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that the public‟s exposure to war images could be regulated and managed. New media 
technology challenges these norms. In this part, three points are examined: first, the different 
types of war photography; secondly, the way that new media technology is changing the 
visualisation of war; and thirdly, the habits of soldiers – using digital cameras, and access to 
the Internet, to document every aspect of their experiences in contemporary war zones.   
A. War Photos: Official and Unofficial 
War photography is nothing new. The tradition of photographing the soldiers, battles, 
casualties and aftermaths of military campaigns can be traced right back to the time of the 
first cameras in the nineteenth century. The tradition of censorship can be traced back too: 
from the photos of the Crimean War in the 1850s to the first extensive televised reportage of 
war in Vietnam  in the 1960s, and in every military conflict since, the ideological and 
emotional potential of the images of war has been contested.
37
 One constant in official war 
photography, therefore, is the relationship between governments, military authorities and 
media organisations in relation to the images of war (especially during the conflict).
38
 For 
example, only 200 official photographs were made available to depict the 1982 Falklands 
War, while representations of the 1991 Iraq War focused predominantly on the technological 
superiority of US military action to the exclusion of images of deaths and suffering.
39
 More 
recently, the interest of the Bush Administration in regulating the visual field of US military 
action, and the deference thereto of both US political and media establishments, was 
encapsulated in the refusal to show images of the returning coffins of US military 
personnel.
40
 
Unofficial or personal war photography is also not a new phenomenon. Soldiers have 
always taken „memento‟ photos of different aspects of their military lives when on 
deployment. Images of comradeship, daily barracks life, „foreign‟ landscapes or associations 
with military equipment (such as posing with guns or on tanks) can be found from many 
military conflicts. What distinguished these types of representations historically, however, 
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was their personal nature, a limited intended viewing audience of comrades and family, and 
their disconnect from the actual details of any military operations.
41
 The physical 
characteristics of the camera were also an obvious limitation on these types of photos: the 
taking, developing and circulating of images of personal life in a war zone is always 
dependent on the available technology. Up until the current digital era, for example, personal 
rolls of film might only be able to be developed in commercial outlets when foreign military 
tours were over.
42
 
Atrocity photographs, the most notorious war images, admit of no easy classification. 
These photos recording the abuse or deaths of individuals were taken for a multitude of 
official and/or personal purposes. Atrocities committed by the Nazis and their collaborators 
in World War II were not hidden, but were recorded in obsessive quantity and detail. Photos 
of rape, torture, executions, the mutilation of bodies, and the immediate aftermath such as 
soldiers standing over graves of the dead, often provided a precise visual record of the 
victims, the location, and the identity of the perpetrators. The interior environments of some 
of the concentration camps, where extermination practices led to the deaths of millions of 
Jewish and other victims, were also captured by official Nazi photographers in order to create 
a visual record. Alongside still photography, propaganda films showing deportations, mass 
executions and the sexual abuse of women, were also produced and distributed.
43
  
Different reasons have been offered to explain the creation by soldiers of these 
official archives: for example, to demonstrate racial/cultural supremacy; to validate military 
superiority; to prove that orders were carried out; to intimidate target populations; or to 
satisfy sadistic impulses. This soldier photography was always part of a dehumanisation 
process: the photo was „an integral part of the humiliation process; in a sense it completed the 
violation‟.44 But the practice of collecting atrocity photos went beyond this. Many other 
photos of humiliation and atrocities were taken by soldiers unofficially, and stored in family 
                                                     
41
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photo albums, ostensibly as personal mementos of willing participation. Some photos „were 
even sent to relatives and friends in Germany, with dedications written on the back‟.45  
Since the Nuremberg war crimes trials, the implications of soldiers using cameras to 
record their abuse or killing of detainees or civilians during wartime is legally 
unambiguous.
46
 Representations of military personnel engaged in atrocities have also had 
evidential, emotional and ideological impacts on war crimes trials.
47
 Video evidence, for 
example, played a key part in the evolution of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), with its early creation of a computerised archive of over 300 
videos of witness testimony of atrocities in the Balkans. Additionally, in a number of ICTY 
cases, prosecution reliance on the discovery of „execution videos‟ recording paramilitary 
forces killing civilians, or military commanders present at the scene of war crimes, has 
proved legally significant.
48
 
The use of cameras in wartime detention facilities is dealt with by the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions which mandate „humane treatment‟ at all times for persons held in captivity. 
Article 13 of the Third Convention in relation to prisoners of war, and Article 27 of the 
Fourth Convention in relation to civilians, specifically provide protection against „public 
curiosity‟49 – a term universally interpreted as requiring a ban on photographs or films 
identifying a detainee‟s face.50 The implication, therefore, is that cameras should always be 
controlled in detention environments. Furthermore, the opportunity for soldier photography 
would be reduced if detention facilities were to strictly comply with Geneva Convention aims 
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 Levin and Uziel, „Ordinary Men, Extraordinary Photos‟ at 6, available at: 
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– as distinct from what occurred in the Iraq war, where there was deliberate blurring of 
detention and interrogation, and the roles of „prison staff‟.51 Significantly, the legal attempt 
by the US government to prevent publication of photos depicting abusive treatment of 
detainees in Iraq and Afghanistan (even where personal features had been concealed) has 
been rejected as contrary to the history and preventative purposes of the Geneva 
Conventions:    
Article 13 of the Third Geneva Convention and Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention do not prohibit dissemination of images of detainees being abused when 
the images are redacted so as to protect the identities of the detainees, at least in 
situations where, as here, the purpose of the dissemination is not itself to humiliate the 
detainees. ... Release of the photographs is likely to further the purposes of the 
Geneva Conventions by deterring future abuse of prisoners.
52
 
B. New Visualisations of War 
New technology has provided military authorities and established media organisations – 
the two main historical sources of images of war – with opportunities to expand, and further 
shape, the visual record of military conflicts. Journalists now have an instantaneous ability to 
upload digital photos and video from the battlefield by satellite to a potential worldwide 
audience. Military personnel now also commonly supply television broadcasters with 
dramatic, live video footage of battlefield scenes and events. Yet, in the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, government controls have limited the visual experience of the public:  
What is most striking about traditional war coverage in the Anglo-American news 
media is that the images are so relatively bloodless, and seldom hint at the capacity of 
modern warfare machinery to injure the human body. In recent years, increasingly 
professional government media management strategies seem to have strengthened the 
wartime dominance of official perspectives in the US and UK mainstream news 
media.
53
  
The common practice of „embedded‟ reporting is one such media management strategy, 
whereby limited journalistic access to a war zone is permitted but only on condition that 
certain images and narratives are (un)reported. Intimidation of journalists by military 
personnel, and the confiscation of their cameras in order to delete unwanted film footage, is 
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another tactic. The result is that „despite the claims of “real time” and spontaneous coverage 
... photographs from the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have been characterized by a 
narrow range of recurrent motifs and routinized scenarios‟.54 One notorious example from the 
2003 Iraq war, the „Jessica Lynch Story‟,55 powerfully demonstrates the combination of 
(apparently) privileged access to the imagery of elite military operations and media 
complicity:  
[T]he Coalition Media Center (CMC) [is based] at the U.S. Central Command 
Headquarters in Qatar. This $1.5 million briefing operation, with a futuristic, 
Hollywood-inspired set replete with plasma TV screens, is housed in a remote 
warehouse hundreds of miles from the battlefield .... [Journalists] were presented with 
an edited five-minute military video – shot through a night lens, producing green, 
grainy images of silhouetted figures – detailing the Special Forces rescue of Private 
Lynch. ... A single still image was taken from this operation and circulated widely, 
showing Lynch lying on a stretcher aboard a U.S. Special Forces helicopter, smiling 
grimly under a U.S. flag draped across her chest.
56
  
One consequence of such media management is that hyper-controversy erupts when radically 
alternative images of war (such as the Baha Mousa and Abu Ghraib
57
 photos) appear – 
representing a very different legal, political and cultural reality.  
Technological developments in actual weapons systems are another factor in the 
heightened visualisation of contemporary war. A standard feature of military aircraft, drones, 
missile and satellite surveillance systems is the facility to video record (often in real time) the 
details of military operations.
58
 While this video footage may be used for intelligence, 
training and propaganda purposes, it also has potential legal significance – if acknowledged 
and made available – for the investigation and prosecution of any alleged war crimes. If 
unauthorised disclosure of military video occurs, it is likely to have an enhanced – and 
perhaps uncontrollable – impact. One such example is the leaking of the audio and visual 
record of the deliberate killing of Iraqi civilians in Baghdad in 2007 by US forces:         
Private Bradley Manning, who had a top-secret security clearance, has been held in 
military custody in Kuwait since his arrest in Iraq in May over the video, which 
caused great embarrassment to the US military establishment. It showed an air strike 
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that killed a dozen people, including two Iraqis working for Reuters news agency. The 
air crew is heard falsely claiming to have encountered a firefight in Baghdad and then 
laughing at the dead. WikiLeaks gave the video the title Collateral Murder.
59
  
Use of war imagery is not confined to state actors; in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq 
groups linked to al-Qaeda have produced and distributed (via DVD and Internet formats) 
videos of military vehicle bombings, „martyrdom‟ attacks and, most controversially, the 
detention and beheadings of civilian and military hostages.
60
 The concern with war 
propaganda, and the use of new media technologies, is now shared by all sides in war. 
Of particular interest to my analysis is the incorporation of new media technology into 
operations by soldiers to identify, arrest and detain individuals for questioning within a war 
zone. The ability to be a „soldier photographer‟ is now greatly expanded from previous eras 
because of the technological abilities of military equipment such as helmet-cameras and 
night-vision goggles, as well as the presence of mobile camera-phones and compact digital 
video recorders. It has also been argued that new forms of technological visualisation of 
„targets‟ exacerbate a process of dehumanisation on the battlefield (reinforced by the 
immediate hooding of detainees) – which may continue to operate even in the ostensibly safer 
space of the military detention facility.
61
   
A revealing insider-perspective on counter-insurgency practices, and the new dominance of 
video technology, is provided by journalist Mark Urban‟s book, Task Force Black; a detailed 
account of UK SAS special forces in Iraq between 2003 and 2009. In one operation, „[v]ideo 
shot by troops shows the moments after they burst in on the hostages‟ and, in another 
operation, soldiers watched „the events unfold on Kill TV back at [the Joint Operations 
Centre] ... [via] the night-vision image captured by the aircraft orbiting above‟.62 Urban also 
confirms that in order to avoid the presence of CCTV surveillance (and potential visits by 
ICRC delegates
63
) in known detention facilities, one US strategy was to construct secret 
„black prisons‟ or, what were known as Temporary Screening Facilities, for the explicit 
                                                     
59
 McGreal, „US Private Bradley Manning Charged with Leaking Iraq Killings Video‟, Guardian, 6 July 2010.  
60
 See Brahimi, „Terrorist Beheadings: Politics and Reciprocity‟ in Scheipers (ed), Prisoners in War (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010) 297.  
61
 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 28 May 2010, 
A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 at para 84 (re the risk of a „Playstation‟ mentality to killings because of the distancing 
effect of technology – computer screens and remote audio-feed – used by the operators of drones). 
62
 Urban, Task Force Black: The Explosive True Story of the SAS and the Secret War in Iraq (London: Little, 
Brown, 2010) at 130 and 143. 
63
 Under the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols of 1977, the ICRC has a mandate to visit 
and register detainees, and to monitor their treatment. 
16 
 
purpose of torture.
64
 Another strategy, used by both US and UK special forces personnel, was 
to take advantage of the „time lag‟ between arrest and formal detention: as Urban puts it, „the 
violent circumstances of many takedowns produced opportunities for their operators to 
question the prisoner before putting him on a helicopter...‟.65 Thus, one effect of the potential 
legal scrutiny of the detention facility on a UK military base in a war zone – that is, extra-
territorial jurisdiction – is that detainee abuse is being transferred to other sites off-base.66 
Moreover, the new predominance of combined US and UK special forces operations, as in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, and the extreme covert nature of these elite military cultures, means 
that the risk of abuse of so-called „high value‟ detainees has grown – and that any visual 
record of human rights violations, if one is kept, is unlikely ever to reach the public domain.
67
    
C. 2003 Iraq War: Soldiers Online 
At the same time, however, the personal photos of individual soldiers have become the most 
expansive, vivid – and controversial – source of war imagery. Mobile phones, digital 
cameras, laptops, email, social networking websites, video-sharing sites, and blogs are now 
common features of soldier life in foreign military operations. The consequences can be 
dramatic, as the following accounts of UK and US military behaviour in Iraq attest: 
Soldiers ... take pictures like crazy ... They take pictures because they‟re bored or 
want souvenirs. They take pictures of people they arrest (an abrogation of the Geneva 
Conventions), of fighters they kill (ditto), of bodies they desecrate (a war crime). 
They email them home or send them with photos of their wives to a porno website or 
string them together and add sound to make commemorative videos.
68
  
When we were out there, we had like a market person that came on and he sold loads 
of DVDs – he sold a lot of DVDs of people being killed and people were taking 
pictures all the time. People were even getting their pictures developed in Iraq so they 
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didn‟t have to take them over to England and get them developed. It was – everybody 
was taking pictures of everything ....
69
 
Recording images has become a central part of soldiers‟ immediate experience – and, later, 
their memory – of war. However, what is really new here is not the increased versatility of 
the digital camera and the desire to create a visual record; it is the ability instantaneously to 
view and share any such records with colleagues and, more particularly, with a potential 
global virtual audience.
70
 The personal soldier perspective, historically confined to the war 
zone, can now be instantly transmitted out of the war zone. A study of US soldier 
photography emphasises that soldiers have diverse reasons for documenting their experiences 
visually and disseminating those images. The photos they take blend „the genres of 
institutional, touristic, and war photography into a new type of solider photography.‟71 
Communicating with family and friends back home; keeping up morale; showing the 
mundane life and frat-style humour of barracks; behaving like a tourist; and providing 
alternative imagery of the „real war‟ are all common motivations for taking and sharing 
images. 
In a study of the explicit „blood and guts‟ imagery of Iraqi war dead posted online on 
one controversial website, Kari Anden-Papadopoulos concludes that the communicative 
function of these atrocity photographs appeared to be three-fold.
72
 First, it was an attempt to 
share the gruesome reality of war with other soldiers, both in terms of dehumanisation of the 
dead „enemy‟, and reliving the personal trauma of either killing or witnessing killing. In light 
of the lethal risks of war, keeping a record (even if horrific) is for soldiers a proof of personal 
survival. Secondly, new online technology provided an insider military community with 
access to an outside public forum where explicit pictures of violent conflict, and 
accompanying soldier commentary, could throw „the discrepancy between military and 
civilian perception of war into sharp relief.‟73 And, thirdly, the photographs were intended to 
intimidate the enemy as violent spectacle and a form of propaganda.
74
 Though graphic and 
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offensive to many, it would be simplistic to conclude that the „new digital generation‟ of 
soldiers photographs and circulates imagery of the dead only for pathological or sadistic 
reasons. In any event, consideration of this issue cannot be confined to individual soldiers. 
On two occasions the US military command in Iraq authorised the publication of explicit 
images of the war dead: playing a video of the badly-wounded sons of Saddam Hussein, and 
displaying an enlarged photograph of the head of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, at a press 
conference. Then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld defended the action, saying that the 
deceased were „two particularly bad characters, and that it‟s important for the Iraqi people to 
see them, to know they‟re gone, to know they‟re dead‟.75 
Photographs of detainees inside detention facilities in a war zone raise different 
considerations. The most notorious collection of such photos from the Iraq war is from Abu 
Ghraib – digital videos and photos of torture and abuse, created by US reservist soldiers who 
guarded the detainees inside the interrogation block of the prison. There is a substantial 
literature on different aspects of the scandal – covering legal, racial, sexual, political and 
cultural dimensions
76
 – but my interest is in two particular issues. The first concerns the 
nature of photographs, specifically the role of interpretation in deciphering their meaning. No 
photograph can be said to have one intrinsic, guaranteed meaning: other interpretations are 
always possible depending on our knowledge, and assumptions, about what is in – or left out 
– of the frame. The contestation over the Abu Ghraib images stems precisely from this: did 
the photos represent the activities of, and enjoyment of, certain individuals engaged in 
(sexualised and racialised) practices associated with the abusiveness, and tedium, of US 
military and penal cultures? Or, did the images represent the central role of such „softening 
up‟ practices in a US government-authorised torture programme designed to extract 
intelligence from detainees in Iraq and elsewhere? Was it possible to interpret some of the 
photos as proof of both these meanings? Also, how should one decipher the motivation of the 
individual soldier photographer in Abu Ghraib: as a person engaged in further voyeuristic 
excess (and with an intention to share the digital photos of naked bodies)? Or, as the creator 
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of an official visual record of the agony and humiliation of the torture victim (with the 
intention of using the most „shaming‟ images as blackmail for detainee co-operation)?77 
These photographs, in other words, cannot tell the whole story: „[t]hey only provide evidence 
of stories, and evidence is mute; it demands investigation and interpretation‟.78 And, as Judith 
Butler points out, investigation and interpretation are not inevitable either: „[o]ne might 
expect that the photo would at once alert us to the abominable human suffering in the scene, 
and yet it has no magic moral agency of this kind‟.79 
The second point concerns official responses and legal contexts. Consider two 
infamous images from the Iraq war: both are photos of corpses, one is Baha Mousa and the 
other is Manadel al-Jamadi, one of the detainees in Abu Ghraib. Both are visual evidence of 
war crimes. However, only the image of Mr Mousa continues to generate an official  search 
for accountability both in relation to the immediate circumstances of his violent death (and 
the attempted cover-up) – and the wider legal and political factors which contributed to the 
abuse, torture and deaths of some Iraqi detainees.
80
 The Abu Ghraib photo of Mr al-Jamadi – 
lying in an unzipped body bag with a battered face while a female soldier, Sabrina Harman, 
poses over him with a smile and a thumbs-up sign – did not generate this sort of response. 
The court-martial of Sabrina Harman for maltreatment of detainees (including posing in 
photographs) deliberately excluded this photo from the evidence.
81
 In spite of global access to 
the digital image of a dead detainee, the presence of numerous witnesses at the location of his 
death, the existence of other photos (taken by Harman) of injuries to his body, and an autopsy 
report confirming a death in US military custody – this particular image of a war crime was 
deemed irrelevant for official purposes. Why? Because Mr al-Jamadi died during a CIA 
interrogation in a shower room in Abu Ghraib – the result of an officially-sanctioned torture 
programme on Iraqi detainees.
82
         
4. Visual Evidence and the Mousa Inquiry 
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Interpretation of photographs is unpredictable. So are the consequences which may follow the 
publication of a photograph, especially where the image depicts violence or suffering. Take 
the example of the Abu Ghraib photos: while visually opening up US practices of detainee 
torture to a worldwide audience, these images also worked to close down public and official 
scrutiny.
83
 This occurred because the most sensational images – for example, smiling soldiers 
posing over pyramids of naked bodies – deflected attention onto the individual perpetrators in 
the photos, and away from the context in which such practices originated, became 
institutionalised and were openly photographed. Media coverage was important in this regard 
as a selective use of photos – for example, Lynndie England holding a naked detainee on a 
leash – reflected the Bush Administration‟s emphasis on isolated acts of mockery, sadism and 
sexual perversion.
84
 The legal process did the same: faced with such photographic evidence at 
the courts-martial of the low-ranking soldiers, the judge ruled that the abuse of the naked 
detainees was the relevant issue, but the „nudity thing‟ – that is, why all the detainees were 
naked in a US military interrogation block – was „irrelevant‟.85 By interpreting the visual 
evidence in this way – focusing only on „bad apple‟ soldiers and their pathological and 
criminal acts – the images did not contribute towards exposing the systematic severity and 
illegality of US interrogation policy: in fact, they worked to sideline it.              
The Mousa Inquiry mandates a different process of investigation. It is forged from 
European human rights law and one of its primary purposes is to establish accountability on 
behalf of the individual victim of serious human rights violations. Where there has been a 
controversial death caused directly or indirectly by UK state actors, and other mechanisms 
(such as a court-martial) have failed, Article 2 ECHR requires the state to conduct „an 
effective public investigation by an independent official body‟ into the circumstances of the 
death.
86
 The perspectives and interests of the victim are formally represented in the process: 
the „relatives of the deceased must be able to play an appropriate part in it‟.87  
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What this means in relation to visual evidence before the Mousa Inquiry is that the 
images cannot be interpreted just as a story of „bad apple‟ soldiers. Soldier photography 
provides crucial evidence of the individual soldier(s) involved in the abuse and death of Mr 
Mousa, but the Inquiry is required to focus both on the actual perpetrators of the violence – 
and the extent to which systematic policies and failings in military, political and legal circles 
were connected to the death. A central question is what significance the visual evidence will 
have in the Inquiry findings. In particular, how will the visualisation of the suffering of Mr 
Mousa – in the one-minute video which shows him undergoing „conditioning‟– be 
interpreted? Can one expect that a claim of „torture‟ will be recognised as such when it is 
made against state actors in a legal forum? Moreover, what are the risks if the video (and 
other visual evidence) is used to support an official Inquiry finding that Mr Mousa was not 
tortured?
88
   
The first point to note is that the Mousa video provides the Inquiry with the location, 
date and time of the events; a timeline can be established because the camera analysis 
confirms that „the footage was shot on 14 September at 08:02:17‟ and – because of the 
difference in time zones – the actual time in Basra would be either 11:02:17 or 12:02:17.89 
Moreover, the visual images of the physical environment challenge assertions that the 
duration and ferocity of the abuse was unknown to others not in the „Temporary Detention 
Facility‟ (TDF): „the windows were open, meaning noise could be heard outside ... the 
entrance to the accommodation block.‟90 Secondly, lawyers for the victims have firmly 
placed the video footage in a wider context of abusive solider photography, and insisted upon 
one particular interpretation of the visual frames:        
One means of controlling and de-humanising the enemy-other in one‟s own mind, was to photograph 
him. The video ... was such an act: a commemoration of torture – with Payne occasionally looking 
straight into the camera meaningfully. The film of the TDF itself apparently acquired the title amongst 
some soldiers as the House of Pain.
91
  
                                                     
88
 Space does not permit a discussion of the interpretation of autopsy photographs. Whether the photographed 
injuries were visible to military medics at the time of Mr Mousa‟s attempted resuscitation or not; and their 
significance in determining the nature and level of violence inflicted, and the ultimate cause of his death, are all 
heavily-contested issues before the Inquiry. 
89
 PIL Closing Sub002225 at para 126. 
90
 PIL Closing Sub002399 at para 453. 
91
 PIL Closing Sub 002622 at para 223. Only Inquiry personnel can judge this gaze because Corporal Payne‟s 
face is redacted in the video released to the public. PIL also make reference to the other examples of photos 
found amongst soldiers in the regiment, including images of dead bodies, hooded prisoners and prisoners in 
forced positions. One soldier, Private Mackenzie, created fake photos, representing the abuse of Iraqi detainees, 
which he sold to the Daily Mirror in May 2004. 
22 
 
The key point of dispute is how the violence represented in the video should be 
characterised.
92
 This is of crucial significance for the wider contestation over British Army 
practices of „conditioning‟ and alleged torture. Will the images be interpreted by the Inquiry 
giving greater weight to the perspective of the victims (Mr Mousa and the other TDF 
detainees)? One thing that is clear is that there is no one soldier perspective on the video 
evidence. For example, ex-Corporal Payne, admitted to the Inquiry that his behaviour in the 
video was „appalling‟ and „inhuman‟.93 In contrast Major Peebles, a commanding officer in 
Payne‟s regiment, believed that the practices shown were not „going over the top‟ because 
there was „no physical harm or assaults‟.94 Other soldiers testified that the hooding and forced 
stress positions shown in the video were intended to maintain „the shock of capture‟; far from 
being arbitrary, it was „standard operating procedure‟ taught in training.95  
In some of the Inquiry evidence, it is apparent that the interpretive debate on the 
visual images is being shaped by particular legal knowledge. The Treasury Solicitors, who 
are representing senior military and governmental actors, have accused the victims‟ lawyers 
of seeking „to blur the distinction between conditioning and conventional violence‟96 – and 
have insisted that „“[t]orture” today constitutes the worst of mistreatment, the worst of cruelty 
at the hands of the state.‟97 The MoD‟s approach is to deny condoning an illegal interrogation 
policy. Thus, while acknowledging that „gratuitous violence‟ was inflicted on the detainees 
over a lengthy period, the MoD strongly disputes that a military „culture of casual violence‟ 
existed in Iraq.
98
 It admits that hooding for interrogation purposes is illegal and that „brutality 
and inhumanity‟ were inflicted on Mr Mousa;99 it argues, however, that the motives for the 
violence were „misplaced revenge‟, „sheer thuggery‟, „sadism‟ and „loss of control‟ in a 
handful of soldiers
100
 – in other words, none of the violence implemented, or was influenced 
by, British Army interrogation policy or practices. In contrast, the victims‟ lawyers interpret 
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the evidence in the video to substantiate two key points: first, that it is the perspective of the 
victims, not the perpetrators, which must be paramount in deciphering the violence: 
From the point of view of the recipient of the conduct seen on that video, would it not feel like a 
beating? ... Moreover, from the point of view of the observer, one must take into account that this is a 
handcuffed and hooded prisoner, rendered particularly vulnerable by his loss of liberty, sight and 
freedom of movement, not knowing what will happen next. ... But in terms of the experience of pain, ...  
these [assaults] mould into one.
101
 
Their second point is that the video provides us with a visual snapshot of the early stages of 
an incident of torture – which ended with the death of Mr Mousa and injuries to the other 
detainees: 
[T]he treatment of the detainees over the [36 hour] period did amount to torture in the sense of 
constituting severe pain and suffering intentionally carried out by state agents for the purposes of 
obtaining information and inflicting punishment ....
 102
   
They insist that the Inquiry „should call what happened to the victims what it is‟.103 It remains 
to be seen whether the Inquiry will accept this interpretation and, in particular, what 
significance will be placed on the video footage in light of the competing accounts of 
applicable legal standards and the conflicts between witness testimony.      
5. Conclusion 
In this article, my focus has been on soldier photography, specifically the use of digital 
cameras in detention facilities located in a war zone. Where images of serious human rights 
violations in such environments are created and distributed, the impact may be significant in 
cultural, political and legal terms. But, as with the images of Baha Mousa (and the Abu 
Ghraib photos), different interpretations of what is meant by „abuse‟ or „torture‟, and who 
should be held to account, always come into play. The camera does not provide an 
unchallengeable record of what happened. We have seen that a visual image, on its own, does 
not have the power or „magic moral agency‟ to dictate a particular response. Photos of 
atrocities have always been circulated in certain environments – being enjoyed, shared, 
ignored – without any accompanying outrage or sanction. Moreover, in legal contexts, this 
visual evidence may have to enter into a competition with other types of evidence which 
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advance a different version of truth. Images of suffering, in other words, have the potential to 
work in different directions. 
It is for this reason that I have highlighted the importance of the political and legal 
contexts in which a particular visual representation is given a specific meaning
104
 – and the 
distinctive nature of the Mousa Inquiry. Looking ahead, the official Inquiry report will 
provide one means of assessing the role, and significance, of soldier photography from a 
human rights perspective. But a wider assessment is also needed. One matter that needs to be 
explored is the extent to which the new ECHR-driven inquiry differs from previous official 
efforts to investigate controversial actions by armed services personnel (especially special 
forces).
105
 Often, where images of military violence have been in issue, the power of the 
official interpretation of events has prevailed – for example, the 30 January 1972 („Bloody 
Sunday‟) killings of 13 civilians by the British Army in Northern Ireland was photographed, 
filmed and audio-recorded by the international media as it happened, yet this visual record 
had no influence on the initial judicial inquiry.
106
 The Mousa Inquiry, the future Al-Sweady 
Inquiry and a potential Al Zaki Mousa inquiry
107
 provide important opportunities to 
determine the merits of new accountability mechanisms.  
Another issue is the significance of the extension of ECHR extra-territoriality to the 
space of the military prison in a war zone. This extension was of paramount importance in 
relation to the Iraq war because US/UK military intervention quickly descended into a war of 
occupation and counter-insurgency.
108
 Mass detention of Iraqi civilians led to a focus on the 
interior life of hitherto unknown spaces such as the Temporary Detention Facility and the 
Temporary Internment Facility, especially as the treatment of „detainees‟ had been raised as a 
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major human rights concern from the start of the conflict.
109
 However, there are other spaces 
where detainee abuse or torture can occur – off-base locations or when inside military 
vehicles on patrol – which are not within UK jurisdiction.110 In any event, military 
authorities, now acutely aware of the power of new media technologies to expose and 
embarrass, may enhance their efforts to control and censor the visual field of war by closing 
down soldier photography. Furthermore, while the general desire to record and share personal 
experiences may continue to grow, can one expect (after the various „abuse photo‟ scandals 
and a process like the Mousa Inquiry) that British Army personnel would risk posing with the 
same sense of impunity in any future video or photos? Soldier photography as a potential 
human rights resource may, therefore, be limited.         
A final issue to be addressed is the use of photographs of suffering and victimhood. It 
must be recognised that a visual focus on the suffering of the victim may, paradoxically, limit 
our understanding of the perpetrator of the violence. Of course, this opens up definitional 
questions about the meaning of perpetrator as some may present themselves as „victims‟ (for 
example, of war, of superior orders or of peer pressure). The answer to such questions may 
also result in different consequences in relation to how law views the credibility and 
motivation of the „witness‟ photographer.111 In the Mousa video, Corporal Payne‟s face is 
blanked out so we are somewhat constrained in our interpretation of his actions and emotions. 
In these images, should we see a racist and violent bully, or a soldier playing his allotted part 
in „conditioning‟ of detainees? Will he become more humanised in public opinion if the 
official Inquiry report commends his change of evidence, and his revelation of intentional 
mass beatings of Mr Mousa? The perpetrator perspective is important because we need to 
engage with, and try to understand, the pressures, conditions and events which lead soldiers 
to act in this way. Torture in a war zone occurs because of the action – or inaction – of many 
individuals (including military lawyers), all of whom may appear „normal‟ people.112 
Atrocity photographs, as discussed earlier, are both shocking and unremarkable precisely 
because they unashamedly represent this „normality‟ in visual form. 
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As to the victims, on the one hand, the image of the abused or tortured detainee is 
humanising because it creates the potential for recognition and empathy. On the other hand, 
endless re-publication of the image would be a further dehumanisation: for example, the Abu 
Ghraib media coverage shows naked, terrified, humiliated individuals in pain and distress. 
Where faces are blanked out to protect privacy, or bodily features cropped by picture editors, 
only a disembodied representation remains – in other words, „photos of people who are for 
the most part faceless and nameless‟.113 The face of Baha Mousa is not revealed in the video 
because he is hooded; we only „know‟ him after his death, as a victim, because the autopsy 
photograph is the most widely-circulated media representation of him.
114
 The dilemma, 
therefore, is knowing how to expose the human rights violation, and generate the appropriate 
responses, without further violating the rights of the victims or their relatives. When that 
image of suffering becomes entangled in a post-Iraq war introspection, of which the Mousa 
Inquiry is a part – or the image is an archived graphic symbol on newspaper websites – 
determining what is and is not acceptable is made more difficult. Finally, new digital 
technology provides the capacity to record, copy, publicise and consume visual imagery in 
numerous ways, but how will this ability affect how we remember contemporary 
atrocities?
115
 Photographic representations of the Holocaust, for example, belong in no 
special category, when it comes to interpretations of their meaning, their contemporary 
purpose, or the limits of appropriate use of the images.
116
 There are also no controls on who 
can create, or access, a website displaying an atrocity photograph.
117
 After the Mousa Inquiry 
concludes, what will happen to the images of Mr Mousa?  
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